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CONCERT OF ACTION BY SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE:
WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO UNCONSCIOUS AIDING
AND ABETTING?
E. Dana Neacsu*
I.

INTRODUCTION

As one commentator has uncomfortably noted, in the 1980's,
courts seemed inclined to develop and use theories of liability, which
ensured that the risk of injury and loss was transferred from
consumer victims to manufacturers and then, through the price
mechanism, to the community-at-large. That was a time when courts
seemed to be comfortable applying product liability without fault,
and holding manufacturers as "insurers even for those products,
which previously would not have been considered 'defective' in
design, in manufacture, or in marketing." 2 Products liability, in the
ensuing decade, has lost its nerve, 3 or more accurately, the courts
charged with responsibility to do justice in such circumstances
have scaled the doctrine back, as well as some of the collateral
doctrines necessary to accomplish its objectives.

Corporation Counsel, New York City Law Department. Facultatea
de Drept, Bucharest, Diploma de Drept, 1989; Faculte de Droit et des Etudes
Politiques, Caen, France, D.E.A, 1991; Harvard Law School, LL.M., 1994. The
author thanks her husband, Professor Mickey Davis, and her step daughter,
Abby, for their assistance, endurance, and love.
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1Robert G. Berger, The Impact of Tort Law Development on hsurance: The
Availability/Affordability Crisis and Its Potential Solutions, 37 AM. U.L. REv.

285,297-99 (1988).

2Id.at 298.
3 The retreat of product liability is probably too notorious to require citation.

However, it may be worthwhile to consider the latest Restatement in which strict
liability has been banished from the areas of design and warning defects, areas
where fault liability is notoriously unhelpful to plaintiffs. Strict products
liability was originally intended for these areas, but only remains in the area of
manufacturing defects, where it is singularly unnecessary. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OFTORTS § 402A (1965).
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This note is based on the observation that liability based upon
concert of action, as implicitly recognized by the New York Court of
Appeals in Bichler v. Eli Lilly,4 seemed to be a suitable tool to further
the public policy enunciated above, but that, sadly, it has been
abandoned. New York courts, in the years since Bichler,5 seem to
avoid concert of action, at least in its fully-developed form as
articulated in section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,6
despite the fact that Bichler rested exclusively on that doctrine.
Sometimes New York courts reject concert of action - a very
tempting and generous collective liability theory - in favor of other
collective theories more demanding of plaintiffs, and thus more
difficult to prove, such as market share liability.8 For example, the
New York Court of Appeals applied market share liability instead of
concert of action in Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co." At other times, New
York state and federal courts, as discussed below, rather timidly
recognized only express conspiracy or conscious "aiding and
abetting" as constituting concert of action liability; that is, sections
876 (a) and (b), without subsection (c).' 0 It is intriguing that the third
55 N.Y.2d 578, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982)(applying
concerted action pursuant to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 876 (1977)).
4

5Id.
6

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 876 (1977) (defining concert of action);
See also infra notes 14-18 and accompanying text for definition of concert of
action.
7 See

Bichler, 79 A.D.2d 317,436 N.Y.S.2d 625.
concert of action, as opposed to market share, only one manufacturer has
to be sued. Bichler, 55 N.Y.2d at 577-78, 436 N.E.2d at 186, 450 N.Y.S.2d at
781. Moreover, aside from direct proof of conscious conspiracy or of aiding and
abetting, mere proof of manufacturers' "parallel conduct" mutually reinforcing
their otherwise individual tortious conduct (e.g., failure to test the product on
pregnant mice, See id. at 578, 436 N.E.2d at 188, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 782) may
suffice. One commentator has noted defendants "detest" concert of action as
opposed to market share because of its plaintiff-orientation.
9 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1989) (acknowledging
that its main purpose was to do justice administratively feasible in the context of
"mass litigation" (500 other cases)), cert. denied sub nom., Rexall Drug Co. v.
Ti gue,
493 U.S. 944 (1989).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977). This section provides:
8 In

For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of
another, one is subject to liability if he

(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a
common design with him, or
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version of concert of action, discussed in section 876 (c) of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts," and successfully applied in
Bichler,12 has seemingly been ignored or even abandoned by New
3
York courts.'
I.

-TILEPROBLEM POSED BY THE THREE
VARIETIES OF CONCERT OF ACTION

Concert of action, at least as rendered by the Restatement, has
three varieties.'4 The first variety is indistinguishable from
traditional conspiracy, requiring all actors to knowingly join a
tortious venture, while not requiring each member to actually engage
The second variety is similarly
in the injurious act.' 5
indistinguishable from classical aiding and abetting, requiring that all
actors knowingly give substantial assistance to the wrongdoer, while
again not requiring that each actor engage directly in the injurious
act.' 6 The third variety requires that.each actor engage in wrongful
conduct that has the effect of substantially assisting the other(s),
while, unlike the first two, not requiring any knowledge at all of the
other's injurious act.' 7 Because this is almost identical to classical

(b)knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty
and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so
to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a
tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered,
constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.
Id
Caveat: The Institute takes no position on whether the rules stated in this Section
are applicable when the conduct of either the actor or the other is free from intent to

do harm or negligence but involves strict liability for the resulting harm. Id.

"Id at § 876(c).
12

Bichler v. Eli Lilly, 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776

(1982).
13 See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541
N.Y.S.2d
941 (1989).
4
1 RFATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS

'1Id. at § 876(a).
161d at § 876(b).
171d at § 876(c).

§ 876 (1977).
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aiding abetting without the requirement of knowledge, it seems
accurate to characterize it as "unconscious aiding and abetting." 8
The reasons for the judicial retreat from concert of action as a
theory by which a party can be held liable for the injurious conduct
of another are several, but certainly among the most important is
judicial discomfort with theories which impose liability without any
personal wrong or, in a sense, liability without fault. Thus, it is not
surprising that, in an age when courts and commentators limit
product liability because of their unease with the notion of liability
without fault, they similarly distance themselves from doctrines that
tend to impose liability for the wrongful acts of others. 9 Except for
classic conspiracy - and even there doubts seem to exist at some
levels - courts seem nervous about doctrines which lack a direct
connection between wrongful act and tortious harm.2"
As a result, at least two elements of concert of action have become
troublesome, and yet the trouble seems more a product of confusion
and ignorance than of logic. One area is that of "parallel action."'"
Parallel action can be the basis of liability for concerted action to
showing, circumstantially, that the parties knew of each other's acts
and perhaps even engaged in an agreement, tacit or otherwise, to
achieve a common goal.22 In that sense, parallel action is simply an
18 Throughout this article, the terms "unconscious aiding and abetting" and
"subsection (c) liability" are used interchangeably because they seem identical
and because "unconscious aiding and abetting" accurately dramatizes the utility
and significance of that doctrine. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 876(c) (1977).
19 See, e.g., Shackil v.Lederle Laboratories, a Division of American Cyanamid
Co., 116 N.J. 155 (1989).

The court provided that as there are "inherent

problems [with] applying concert-of-action theory to prescription drugs, we are

persuaded that the theory is not applicable to this case." Id. at 164. Furthermore
the court found that there were "no allegations that the manufacturers of DPT
had a 'tacit understanding' or 'common plan' to produce a defective product or
not to conduct adequate tests on the vaccine." Id. The court concluded by
noting that in contrast to DES manufacturers, "each of the manufacturers
involved in this case made the DPT vaccine by a different process, protected by
patent or trade secret." Id.
21ld
20
Id.
21 See, e.g., Ryan v. Eli Lilly, 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1016 (D.S.C. 1981).
22 The courts are reluctant to allow parallel action to prove an implied or tacit

agreement. Were it not for the underlying doctrine making one defendant liable
for another defendant's acts, it would be difficult to understand why a court
would have a problem with parallel action. Parallel action, after all, is nothing
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evidentiary doctrine allowing a court to conclude that an agreement
is implied where there is no evidence, or a failure of evidence, to
prove express agreement.2 The other area is also the third branch of
concerted action: liability due to tortious conduct substantially
assisting another's injurious acts without knowledge of that other's
tortious conduct, which can be accurately characterized as
unconscious or unknowing aiding and abetting.'
It is surely not coincidental that both of these areas from which
courts have retreated share one thing in common: an absence of
proof of knowledge of the tortfeasor's wrongful conduct. In that
sense, they share some element of strict liability that has
characterized, at least until recently, modem product liability law.26
more than a particular application of the use of circumstantial evidence to prove
indirectly, that which cannot be proven through direct evidence. See Sea-Land
Service, Inc. v. Atlantic Pacific International, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1100-01
(D.Hawaii 1999); McClure v. Owens Coming Fiberglass Corp., 298 Ill.App.3d
591, 598, 698 N.E.2d 1111, 1116 (1998); But see Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 173
Ill.App.3d 1, 18, 527 N.E.2d 333, 344 (1988).
23 See In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 128 (3d Cir. 1999). The
Baby Foodthe court commented that "[i]n the absence of direct evidence, as we
previously stated, consciously parallel business behavior can be important
circumstantial evidence from which to infer an agreement." Id. See also
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 596 F. Supp. 62, 69 (E.D.Pa. 1984). In Bogosian,
the court noted that the "[pllaintiffs, not surprisingly, do not have direct
evidence of a conspiracy. Plaintiffs do, however, have certain circumstantial
evidence. Plaintiffs offer the testimony of expert witnesses that the defendants
engaged in consciously parallel action .... ." Id.
See Bichler v. Eli Lilly, 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776
(1982). The Court of Appeals, in Bichler, understood parallel action to be some
kind of substantive element of concert of action whose acceptance would
impermissibly alter concert of action and illegitimately extend it. But it seems
inescapably obvious that parallel action is nothing more than an evidentiary
doctrine which defendants fear. The court is overly sensitive to this fear
characterizing it, first, as substantive, and second, as unacceptable. Id. at 582.
'5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1977). An actor is liable for
harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another "if he...
knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial
assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself... ." Id.
26 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977). Under §
402A the plaintiff must prove that:
(1) the seller was engaged in the business of selling the product
that caused harm; (2) the product was sold in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user; (3) the product
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Although parallel action should really be viewed as a relatively
unintrusive evidentiary rule, it seems likely that courts which see it as
part of concerted action, generally, are confusing it with the third
branch of concerted action." Since both doctrines, however, are
surely legitimate and historically valid common law mechanisms, the
confusion is doubly unfortunate.
Why is unconscious aiding and abetting important as a legal
doctrine? In multi-party product tort litigation, it may be very
difficult to connect a particular defendant with a particular plaintiff. 8
Absent direct proof of agreement and cooperation between multiple
defendants, or - almost as difficult - proof of knowledge of each
other's tortious acts, there may be no remedy for exactly those kinds
of torts which produce the widest damage (i.e., those involving many
defendants and numerous plaintiffs who may be widely dispersed
over geography and time). To the extent that a court does not allow
proof of merely parallel action to suffice, subsection (c) offers an
was one which the seller expected to and did reach the consumer
or user without any substantial change from the condition in
which it was sold; and (4) the defect was a direct and proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
Id.; see also Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co. Inc. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272,
1274 (1995).
27 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (C) (1977). This section
provides "one is subject to liability if he... gives substantial assistance to the other
in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered,
constitutes a breach of duty to the third person." Id.
28 See e.g., In re Northern District of California Dalkon Shield IUD Product
Liability Litigation, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982) (addressing the difficulty of
proving typicality in personal injury toxic tort cases, particularly in
circumstances in which multiple plaintiffs sue multiple defendants). The Ninth
Circuit states:
In proving liability under a negligence theory, however, the
plaintiffs have to prove not only their injuries, but . . . each
defendant owed them a duty of care and also what those different
standards of care were, if they were breached, and--most
important--if the breaches proximately caused the plaintiffs'
varying injuries . . . . [T]o prove liability under a breach of
warranty theory, representative plaintiffs must exist for each type
of warranty, assurance, or medical advice each plaintiff received.
The difficulty of meeting the typicality requirement seems
obvious.
Id. at 854-55.
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effective alternative, since a party can be liable for the torts of other
defendants without proof that the party knew of the defendant's
tortious conduct.29 Combined with its rejection of parallel action,
New York's apparent rejection of unconscious aiding and abetting
therefore bars recovery in exactly those situations where it is often
most needed, 30 such as cases involving multiple potential defendants
and individual plaintiffs who are unable to prove the state of mind of
those various defendants.3
CONCERT OF ACTION'S FIFTEEN MINUTES OF
FAME

MI.

The fifteen minutes of fame for concert of action came with the
DES32 litigation. Plaintiffs, daughters of mothers who ingested DES
while pregnant with them, sued the DES manufacturers for injuries
suffered as a direct result of their mothers' ingestion of the DES
pill.33 There was no way the actual manufacturer of the ingested pill

29
30

RSTATEmENTTORTS (sEcoND) § 876(c) (1977).
See Bichler v. Eli Lilly, 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776

(1982).
31 id.
32 See iaL at 576-77, 436 N.E.2d at

184, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
Diethylstilbestrol (DES) is a powerful synthetic substance, which duplicates the
activity of estrogen, a female sex hormone naturally present in all women and,
in lesser amounts, present also in men. DES was invented by British researchers
in 1937, but never was patented. As a result, a number of pharmaceutical
manufacturers produced and marketed DES after securing Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approval. The FDA approved the marketing of DES in
the United States for the treatment of vaginitis, enlargement of the breast,
excessive menstrual bleeding, symptoms of menopause, prostrate cancer, and
human miscarriage. The FDA later banned the use of DES for the treatment of
pregnancy-related problems, but not until after the drug had been taken by as
many as several million pregnant women. It was subsequently learned that there
was a link between prenatal exposure to DES and the later development of a
previously rare form of cervical or vaginal cancer in daughters born to women
who had ingested the drug while pregnant. Id.
33 See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Company, 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d
1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1989); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d. 588,
607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980); Enright v. Eli Lilly and Company, 77
N.Y.2d 377,570 N.E.2d 198,568 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1991).
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could be identified.34 What plaintiffs were able to show, however,
was that all the DES manufacturers, when applying for FDA
approval, followed the same pattern as the original twelve DES
manufacturers and marketed the product without first testing it on
pregnant mice. 35
All the later manufacturers relied on the same scientific data as had
the original manufacturers when they produced and marketed the
pill. 36 Liability could have been premised upon agreement between
the various defendants, classical conspiracy, or, alternatively, upon
mutual knowledge and support of the others' torts, classical aiding
and abetting, or upon the fact that each defendant committed the
independent tort of wrongful testing which had the effect of
substantially aiding the others in their tortious acts.37
Such
independent action is unconscious aiding and abetting and does not
require proof of knowledge of the other defendants' tortious
38
conduct.
Only one reported New York decision, Bichler v. Eli Lilly, has
applied concert of action in the Restatement sense, and accordingly
held the manufacturers liable.3 9 After Bichler, several other courts
reluctantly followed it,4" observing, with some accuracy, that New
York law was unclear with regard to the application of concert of
34

Bichler, 55 N.Y.2d at 579, 436 N.E.2d at 185, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 779. The

inability of plaintiffs to identify the specific manufacturer of the DES was due to
the fact that all DES prescribed for pregnant mothers consisted of the identical
chemical composition and was typically manufactured and prescribed generally.
Id.
35 See id. at 55 N.Y.2d at 578, 436 N.E.2d at 185, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 779 (1982).
3
6

37

id.

Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 326, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625, 631 (1st
Dep't 1981).
The [trial] court further stated that concerted action could also be
defined as 'acting independently of each other in committing the
same wrongful act, but although acting independently, their acts
have the effect of substantially encouraging or assisting the
wrongful conduct of the other, which, in this case, was the alleged
failure to adequately test.
Id.
38 Id.
39

Bichler, 55 N.Y.2d 571,436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776.
See Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1989) (noting
that most jurisdictions that have considered [concert of action] have rejected its
application to latent disease product liability cases).
40
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action to product liability cases in general and DES cases in
particular.41 The observation is somewhat accurate because, though
Bichler undoubtedly applied concert of action, arguably in all its
forms, the Court of Appeals avoided addressing the issue decisively
by noting that the defendant had not adequately preserved it for
appeal.42 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals did note that the
evidence was sufficient to satisfy concert of action in all its forms.4
In Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co.," the court denied plaintiff the benefit
of Bichler for reasons of what it called "fairness." According to the
court, other defendants would still be free to claim, against the same
plaintiff, "that concerted action [was] not an appropriate theory of
liability" and following the Bichler approach as to only one
defendant would be inconsistent and unfair. 45 Whether this is
generically true of concert of action as a rule is unclear, though it
seems likely. But the court's argument appears unpersuasive since it
is little different than arguments against, for instance, joint and
several liability which may impose greater liability on one defendant
than others; such "unfairness" is seldom relevant when, as here, the
rule under consideration is expressly designed48 to benefit innocent
plaintiffs at the expense of wrongful defendants.
1L; see also Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Company, 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539
N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1989). In Hyinowitz, the use of concert of
action theory in DES cases was ultimately rejected. The Court of Appeals,
41

speaking through Chief Judge Wachtler, stated:

Now given the opportunity to assess the merits of this theory,
we decline to adopt it as the law of this State. Parallel
behavior, the major justification for visiting liability caused by
the product of one manufacturer upon the head of another
under this analysis, is a common occurrence in industry
generally. We believe, therefore, that inferring agreement

from the fact of parallel activity alone improperly expands the
concept of concerted action beyond a rational or fair limit.

Id at 508,436 N.E.2d at 182,450 N.Y.S.2d at 776.
42 Bichler, 55 N.Y.2d

at 587,436 N.E.2d at 190,450 N.Y.S.2d at 784.

Id. at 584-85. 436 N.E.2d at 188, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 782. There is, of course,
the question of the "notorious" footnote seven, which seems to undercut the
language in the text approving concert of action. See hizfa note 79.
43

44
45 65

N.Y.2d 449, 482 N.E.2d 63, 492 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1985).

Id at 457,482 N.E.2d at 68,492 N.Y.S.2d at 589.
Compare Kaufinan, 65 N.Y.2d at 453 (noting that the concerted action

liability found in Bichler was based on an unresolved question of law, and as
such, it "should not be given preclusive effect in this litigation") with Centrone
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A. Section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
It is certainly, perhaps even tautologically, true that a tortfeasor
acts in concert with another when that tortfeasor acts jointly with the
other in furtherance of a purposively common design.47 This is
classic conspiracy law.
Yet, under the section 876 of the
Restatement, a defendant also acts in concert with another when that
defendant simply (b) "knows that the other's conduct constitutes a
breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement of
the other so to conduct himself' (this is classic aiding and abetting
law); or even more simply, (c) "gives substantial assistance to others
in accomplishing a tortious result if his own conduct, separately
considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person. 48 All
three types of concerted action were considered with arguably
implicit approval in Bichler,49 and later seemingly abandoned in New
York in Hymowitz5
One thing the Restatement does not help with, however, is the
applicability of concert of action to strict product liability. In a
clearly worded caveat, 5' the Restatement expressly avoids taking a
position on this issue."
Clearly, the Restatement subsection (c), unconscious aiding and
abetting liability, demands only a breach of duty, not necessarily
tortious conduct. It requires that one's wrongful action have an
v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 114 Misc.2d 840, 843-44, 452 N.Y.S.2d 299, 302
(Sup. Ct. Nassau Co., 1982) (reading Bichler as the law regarding concert of
action and stating that it is New York law upholding the trial court verdict
because there was "sufficient evidence to support recovery by the plaintiff
pursuant to either a theory of 'concerted action by agreement' or 'concerted
action by substantial assistance.').
47 Id.

Concert of action "could be defined as wrongdoers acting independently of
each other in committing the same wrongful act, but although acting
independently, their acts had the effect of substantially encouraging or assisting
the wrongful conduct of the other." 22 A.L.R.4th 183, 184 (1997) (footnote
48

omitted).

Bichler v. Eli Lilly, 55 N.Y.2d 571, 578, 436 N.E.2d 182, 184, 450
N.Y.S.2d
776, 778 (1982).
50
See supra note 33.
51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 876 (1977).
49

52 id.
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encouraging effect on the other's torts,O without any requirement of
knowledge of the other's torts. However, as case law shows,
unconscious aiding and abetting has received little judicial attention
or support.54 Undoubtedly, unconscious aiding and abetting is the
most threatening to the manufacturing community, but because of its
rejection of a knowledge requirement, it is the most attractive to
victims of multi-party torts. Whether purposely or by accident, by
design or through confusion, New York courts after Bichler have
limited the use of concert of action almost exclusively to traditional
conspiracy and occasionally to aiding and abetting. 55
B.

The BichIer Case

Before Bichler, there was Hall v. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
Inc.s As in Bichler, the defendants in Hall were also manufacturers
of unsafe products.' In Hall, the manufacturers produced blasting

53 id
-54In re New York County DES Litigation, 168 A.D.2d 50, 53, 570 N.Y.S.2d
802, 804 (1st Dep't 1991) (affirming case management order which rejected
concert of action based on Hynzowitz and stare decisis); Morton v. Abbott Labs.,
538 F.Supp. 593 (M.D.Fla.1982) (finding concert of action in non-identification
cases not sustainable under Florida law); Payton v. Abbott Labs., 512 F. Supp.
1031 (D.Mass.1981) (applying same reasoning under Massachusetts law); Ryan
v. Eli Lilly and Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C.1981) (finding same under North
and South Carolina law); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal.3d 588 (1980) (same
under California law); Smith v. Eli Lilly and Co., 173 III.App.3d I
(Ill.App.1988) (same under Illinois law); Zafft v. Eli Lilly and Co., 676 S.W.2d
241(Sup.Ct.Mo. 1984) (en banc) (same under Missouri law); Burnside v. Abbott
Labs., 351 Pa.Super. 264 (Pa.Super. 1985) (same under Pennsylvania law);
Martin v. Abbott Labs., 102 Wash.2d 581 (Sup.Ct. 1984) (en banc) (same under
Washington law); Collins v. Eli Lilly and Co., 116 Wis.2d 166, (Sup.Ct. 1984)
(same under Wisconsin law).
5 See, e.g., Rubel v. Eli Lilly and Co., 1991 WL 29895 (S.D.N.Y.1991)
(finding concert of action theory cannot be applied where there is no proof that
two defendants were the only ones who could have produced the drug plaintiff
took).
56 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that defendants engaged in joint
hazardous conduct and thus could be liable for the joint control of accidental
explosion because their product was manufactured to meet industry-wide safety
standards set by their trade association).
57 Id. at 357.
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caps without the necessary warnings about the product's danger; 5
and as also evident in Bichler, one of the theories of liability was
concert of action. 9
Analyzing the concert of action theory in Hall, Judge Weinstein
stated that it potentially embraces widely varying facts.60 The
existence of an explicit agreement and joint action among the
tortfeasors is the classic "concert of action," but concert of action can
also be established by defendants' "parallel behavior sufficient to
support an inference of tacit agreement or cooperation." 6' The court
did not address either conscious or unconscious aiding abetting
[subsection (b) or subsection (c)] liability.
In Bichler v. Eli Lilly,62 the New York Court of Appeals arguably
affirmed the trial court's treatment of section 876 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, and Prosser's interpretation of it. 3 In Bichler,
plaintiff brought an action against the major manufacturers of DES
for damages caused to her by her mother's ingestion of the drug
while pregnant.' The plaintiff was unable to identify the specific
manufacturer of the pills her mother ingested, and the pharmacist
who apparently filled the prescription was unable to produce any
records showing that they were the defendant's. 5 Since the
plaintiff was unable to prove traditional tort causation she was
allowed to amend her complaint on the theory of concerted action
claiming that defendant and other manufacturers of DES
wrongfully tested and marketed the drug, and, being all liable in
concert, it did not matter that plaintiff could not identify the
specific defendant who caused the damage. 6 The court held that
"[all] those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit
a tortious act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or
request, or who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or
ratify and adopt his acts done for their benefit, are equally liable with
58 id.

" Id. at 360.
60 Id. at 363.
61 Id. at 374. The court found that "such cooperation has the same effects as
overt joint action, and is subject to joint liability for the same reasons." Id.
62 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182,450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1981).
63 Bichler, 55 N.Y.2d at 580-81, 436 N.E.2d at 186,450 N.Y.S.2d at 780.
'4 Id. at 578,436 N.E. 2d at 185, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
65

id.

66 Id.
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him. ' 67 While the trial court expressly adopted subsection (c) in its
jury instructions, Prosser's language does not necessarily embrace
such liability, though the language is not inconsistent with it, either.3
The trial court addressed concerted action in two steps: it first
approached simple conspiracy, noting the requirement for agreement,
but allowing for parallel action to prove an implied agreement in the
possible absence of an express agreement.0 It then addressed both
conscious and unconscious aiding and abetting under the rubric of
"substantial assistance," even though traditional aiding and abetting
requires conscious knowledge of the tortious conduct being aided or
abetted and subsection (c) does not.70 The court demanded
satisfaction of subsection (c)'s wrongful conduct requirement, but
tort,
dispensed with any requirement of knowledge of the ultimate
71
liability.
abetting
and
aiding
unconscious
with
consistent
The trial court discussed the possible express agreement between
That agreement was arguably shown by: the
the defendants.'
original cooperation between the twelve manufacturers and pooling
of information, the agreement on the same basic chemical formula,
and, the adoption of Lilly's literature as a model for package inserts
for joint submission to the FDA in 1941 .7
The trial court also discussed a possible implied agreement. 4 The
court observed that the twelve original manufacturers established a
pattern for the acceptance of DES by the FDA, and thus acted on
behalf of all later manufacturers. 75 The later manufacturers, by
following the pattern of the twelve original manufacturers,
consciously paralleled the original activity (they relied on Lilly's
research studies and requested in their application the same standard
dosage) and 76thus tacitly acceded to the original agreement for their
own benefit.
67 Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at 325, 436 N.Y.S.2d
(4th ed.) § 46, p. 292).
68 id
69

See id. at 327, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 631.

70 id.

71 id.
72

icL

73
Id. at 330,436 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
74id
75
76

id.
id. at 330-3 1, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 633.

at 630 (citing PROSSER, TORTS
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From the conscious parallel conduct among all the DES
manufacturers in marketing the drug without first testing its effect on
pregnant mice, the court found there could be an implied agreement
or understanding between the actors.' In other words, concert of
action by defendants could be proved because although acting
independently, "their acts [had] the effect of substantially
in
encouraging or assisting the wrongful conduct of the other, which,
78
this case, was the alleged failure to adequately test [the drug]."
In Bichler, the Court of Appeals did not reverse the trial court's
recognition of concert of action under all three paragraphs of Section
876."9 However, due to its procedural posture, Bichler never
achieved the status as precedent on the issue and, indeed, with
respect to the use of parallel action as evidence of a tacit agreement,
its holding has been described as a "modification of the concert of
action theory"8 ° or as "a modified form" 8 ' of concert of action which
was not followed thereafter and, in Hymnowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co. ,82
was all but destroyed as a useful legal theory. It is undeniable that
the trial court adopted the Restatement view entirely, and the Court
of Appeals, by noting the failure to preserve the issue, took no
substantive position. 3 Nevertheless, to the extent that it might have
become a precedent for concert of action through subsection (c)
substantial assistance, Bichler did not fulfill expectations.

"I d. at 326, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
78 id.
79d.

80 David A. Fisher, Tort Law: Expanding the Scope of Recovery without Loss

of Jury Control, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 937, 984 (1983).
81 Paul D. Rheingold, The Hymowitz Decision--PracticalAspects of New York
DES Litigation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 883, 885 (1989). The author refers to
footnote 7 in Bichler as "notorious," since the court, despite effectively
declaring the issue non-justiciable because it was not preserved for appeal,
nevertheless seemed to state, in that footnote, that concert of action cannot be
premised on parallel action alone. Id. at 885.
82 73 N.Y.2d 487, 508, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1989), affg sub
nom., Tigue v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 136 Misc. 2d 4i67, 518 N.Y.S.2d 891
(NY Sup. Ct. 1987). See also supra note 33.
83 See supra note 79.
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C. Concert of Action Post-Bichler: Nothing More than
Conspiracyand IntentionalAiding and Abetting
In Hymowitz, " the New York Court of Appeals declined to adopt a
"modified version of concerted action," holding that inferring an
agreement from parallel activity alone would improperly expand the
concept of concerted action "beyond a rational or fair limit."'
The trial court analyzed both theories of liability submitted to the
jury in Bichler.86 After examining the theories of concerted action by
implied agreement under Section 876 (a) and concerted action by
substantial assistance under Section 876 (b) and (c), the court denied
defendants' motion to dismiss. 87 However, on appeal, the court
refused to apply concert of action because the record did not show
anything "beyond [parallel] conduct to show [an] agreement, tacit or
otherwise, to market DES for pregnancy use without taking proper
steps to ensure the drug's safety."' s The court further noted that
"[p]arallel activity, without more, is insufficient to establish the
agreement element necessary to maintain a concerted action claim." s
The court, unfortunately, did not identify exactly what additional
action was required beyond parallel action. Furthermore, the court
completely disregarded unconscious aiding and abetting liability. It
was satisfied with finding for plaintiff under the theory of market
share liability. 90
84Hynowitz,
73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1989).
85

Id. at 508,539 N.E.2d at 1076, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 548.

16

87
88

Tigue, 136 Misc. 2d at 470-71,518 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
Id. at 475, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 897.

Hyniowiz, 73 N.Y.2d at 506, 539 N.E.2d at 1074, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
at 506,539 N.E.2d at 1074-75,541 N.Y.S.2d 946-47 (citations omitted).

' 91d.

90 Paul

D. Rheingold, The Hyinowitz Decision--PracticalAspects of New York

DES Litigation,55 BROOK. L. REV. 883, 886 (1989). The author notes that:
The defendants' detest for concert of action arose from the
obvious consequence that each would be held potentially liable

for 100% of the damages of each DES injured person, and that
once concert of action was applied liability was inherently
established. By contrast, under the market share doctrine, the
defendants saw not only that liability would have to be established
separately, but also that, if joint liability were rejected, they would
be liable only for their share of the market, however that might be

worked out.
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In Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,9' the court rejected
liability premised on concerted action via conspiracy. 92 The plaintiff
claimed that liability existed on the basis of concerted action by
certain defendants, including Goodyear, Firestone, Budd and KelseyHayes.93 Defendants were "manufacturers of substantially all multipiece tire rims in the United States, with respect to the design,
manufacture and marketing 'of a dangerous and defective product
and the failure to warn of same."'4
The Appellate Division, Third Department, denied defendants'
motions to dismiss in Rastelli.95 That court held that the plaintiff had
a right to attempt to establish that the manufacturers of the offending
rims engaged in tortious activity by breaching a post-sale duty to
warn. 96 The court also held that the plaintiff had a right to establish
that the breach was the result of a collective understanding to
"prevent public awareness of the extreme propensity of all such rims
to explode; and to block governmental action which would have
required the manufacturers to recall those products. 97 The Court of
Appeals, however, reversed and dismissed the concert of action
claim, largely by rejecting the use of parallel action to show an
implied agreement." 8 It emphasized that each defendant charged
with "acting in concert" must have acted tortiously and that one of
the defendants must have acted in pursuance of the agreement."
Then it relied on Hymowitz, which:
declined to adopt a modified version of concerted
action... inferring agreement from the common
occurrence of parallel activity... [B]ecause application
of concerted action renders each manufacturer jointly
liable for all damages stemming from any defective
product of an entire industry, parallel activity by
9 79 N.Y.2d 289, 591 N.E.2d 222, 582 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1992).
92 Id. at 297-98, 591 N.E.2d at 225, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 376-377.
93 Id. at 296, 591 N.E.2d at 224, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 378.

Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 165 A.D.2d 111, 113, 565
N.Y.S.2d 889, 890 (3d Dep't 1991).
95 Id. at 116, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
96
Id. at 115, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
97
id.
98 Rastelli, 79 N.Y.2d 289, 295, 591 N.E.2d 222, 224, 582 N.Y.S.2d 373, 375.
94

99 Id.
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manufacturers is not sufficient justification for making
one manufacturer responsible for the liability caused by
the product of another manufacturer.'00

The Rastelli court concluded that it saw "no reason ... for extending
the concerted action concept to create industry-wide liability and
make recovery possible when... plaintiff alleges only parallel
activity."101
Post Rastelli, New York courts have viewed concert of action as
virtually, if not in fact, synonymous with conspiracy.' 2 For
example, the court in Appavoo v. Phillip Morris Inc.,"'3 held that
"[t]he elements of a concerted action claim are: 1) an agreement
express or tacit to participate in a common plan or design to commit
a tortious act, and 2) that each defendant acted tortiously, and 3) that
one of the defendants committed a tort pursuant to the agreement."'4
Similarly, in Cresser v. American Tobacco Company,'0 5 the New
York State Supreme Court in Kings County, possibly confusing
subsections (a) and (c) liability, compared the elements of concerted
action with th& elements of civil conspiracy.' 0 6 The court held that
they differ only in "the fact that concerted action require[d] each of
the parties to the unlawful agreement to have committed a tortious
act while the conspiracy require[d] only one of the participants of the
agreement to have committed an overt act in furtherance of the
agreement." 10 7 In King v. Eastman Kodak Co.,0 3 the court
incorporated Prosser's definition of concert of action, ' r9 but denied
'0o
Id. at 295-96, 591 N.E.2d at 224, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 375(citations omitted).

. 93 Id. at 296, 591 N.E.2d at 225, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 376.

See, e.g., In re New York Silicone Breast Implant Litig., 166 Misc. 2d 85,
91, 631 N.Y.S.2d 491 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, 1995) (denying concert of action,
and holding "that inferring agreement from common occurrence of parallel
activity alone would improperly expand the concept of concerted action beyond
a rational or fair limit").
103 1998 WL 440036, at *1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Jul. 24, 1998).
'04 1998 WL 440036, at *6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Jul. 24, 1998) (internal
102

quotes omitted).

105 174 Misc.2d 1, 662 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1997).
106 Id.
'0 7 Id.at 7, 662

N.Y.S.2d at 378-79 (footnote omitted).

l0s
219 A.D.2d 550, 631 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1st Dep't 1995).
109 Id.at 552, 631 N.Y.S.2d 833; PROSSER AND KEETON, ON TI-LAW OF

TORTS § 46 (5th ed. 1984) (defining the principal of concerted action as one that
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defendants' liability for concert of action by substantial assistance."1 °
Federal cases post Rastelli understand Rastelli to be a conspiracy
theory case, being premised on a showing of the traditional
"common design" approach, having nothing to do, of course, with
Bichler's "substantial assistance" theory."'
New York courts treat conspiracy" 2 the same as its sister-state
courts do," 3 and in the same manner as the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, except for the outright rejection of parallel action as a merely
evidentiary method of proving agreement." 4 Notably, New York
courts treat aiding and abetting similarly, in a completely
unremarkable common law manner. "5
holds liable all those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a
tortious act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or
who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt the
wrongdoer's acts done for their benefit).
110 King, 219 A.D.2d at 552, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 833.

11See Pittman v. Grayson, 149 F.3d 111, 122 (2d Cir. 1998); Fletcher v. Atex,
Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1464 (2d Cir. 1995).
112 See e.g., Rose v American Tobacco Co., 1997 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 662 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County, Oct. 15, 1997). The Rose court stated that "in order to use the
concerted action theory, there must have been a tortious act committed by each
of the conspirators within the scope of an agreement." Id. at *9-*10.; see also
Lindsay v. Lockwood, 163 Misc. 2d 228, 625 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1994). The Lindsay court defined the tort concept of conspiracy as
requiring "(1) an agreement (2) to participate in an unlawful act, (3) an injury
caused by an unlawful overt act performed by one of the parties to the
agreement; (4) which overt act was done pursuant to and in furtherance of the
common scheme." Id at 234, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 398 (internal quotes omitted)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876, comment a, illustration 2).
113 See supra, note 23.
114 See, e.g., DaSilva v. American Tobacco Co., 175 Misc. 2d 424, 667
N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. New York Co., 1997). The DaSilva court held that
allegations amounting to mere parallel activity among manufacturers was
insufficient, and liability requires evidence of an actual agreement to commit an
intentional tortious act. Id. at 431, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
i's See, e.g., Lindsay v. Lockwood, 163 Misc. 2d 228, 625 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup.
Ct. Monroe County 1994). The Lindsey Court noted that "[t]he elements of
aiding and abetting are (1) a wrongful act producing an injury, (2) the
defendant's awareness of a role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at
the time he provides the assistance; and (3) the defendant's knowing and
substantial assistance in the principal violation." Id. at 233, 625 N.Y.S.2d at
397) (internal quotes omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876,
comment d, illustrations 4 & 5); Pittman v. Grayson, 149 F.3d Il1 (2d Cir.
1998). "In order to be liable for acting in concert with the primary tortfeasor
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IV.

CONCLUSION

While Bichler provided an inviting opportunity to use unconscious
aiding and abetting as a means to assist consumers injured by
products sold through an essentially anonymous marketplace, that
opportunity was never realized. What remains of concert of action
for product liability plaintiffs is painfully wanting. New York courts
perceive concert of action to consist only of conspiracy and aiding
and abetting. In Litsay v. Lockwood for example, the court
characterized concert of action as either conspiracy or, somewhat
inaccurately, "aiding
and abetting" from criminal law, ignoring
6
section 876 (c).1

Similarly, in Pittmaz v. Grayson,' 7 the Second Circuit, relying on
Rastelli, and Lindsay, recently discussed the elements of concertedaction liability, and noted that it included, inter alia, an express or
tacit agreement "to participate in 'a common plan or design to
commit a tortious act."'... Then it distinguished between Section
876(a) and (b), accurately, stating that paragraph (a) describes
"conspiracy" and paragraph (b) "aiding and abetting." "I However,
Pittman made no reference to subsection (c). In many ways it seems
that, after BichIer, unconscious aiding and abetting simply does not
exist.
Similarly, in Sackrnaz v. Liggett Group, Inc.,'" the court's
discussion of concert of action was limited to theories advanced by

under either theory [conspiracy, pursuant to Rastelli or aiding and abetting], the
defendant must know the wrongful nature of the primary actor's conduct." Id. at
123.
16 Lindsay, 163 Misc. 2d at 234, 625 N.Y.S.2d
at 398.
"7 149 F.3d at, 122 (2d Cir. 1998).
In Pittnan, Iceland Airlines (hereinafter
"Icelandair") was accused of conspiracy in helping defendant remove plaintiff
from the joint custody arrangements, and fly them to Iceland. Id. The court
affirmed the trial court's judgment setting aside a verdict against Icelandair as a
coconspirator or an aider and abettor on the ground that it did not have sufficient
notice about defendant's tortious conduct. Id.
11 Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 79 N.Y.2d 289, 295, 591
N.E.2d
222,224, 582 N.Y.S.2d 373, 375 (1992) (quoting Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
73 N.Y.2d 487,506,539 N.E.2d 1069,541 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1989)).
" 9 Pittnan, 149 F.3d at 123.
120965

F. Supp. 391 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
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subsections (a) and (b).12 The court's emphasis on defendant's
fraudulent conduct, involving a scheme with other tobacco
manufacturers concealing information in their possession regarding
the health risks associated with smoking, seems typical of present
courts in treating concert of action in its conspiracy sense alone. '22
Sadly, concert of action in New York is limited to only conspiracy
and conscious aiding and abetting. Unconscious aiding and abetting
had its day, in Bichler, and that day is over.

121 id.

122 Id. at 397.

